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CONSTITUTION-MAKING AT BONN

An Article¹

Overshadowed by the more dramatic developments that are taking place in Berlin, a conclave of 65 German political leaders is sitting these days at Bonn on the Rhine—a meeting that may rank in the perspective of history as a much more significant event. This “Parliamentary Council”, as it is officially called, is engaged in the task of drawing up a constitution for the government of Western Germany.

These 65 men are the representatives of the 46,000,000 Germans who live in the states of the Western zones of Germany. Assembled in this gathering are the delegates from Bavaria, Württemberg-Baden, Hesse, and the city of Bremen in the United States zone; North Rhine Westphalia, Lower Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein, and the city of Hamburg in the British zone; and the Rhine Palatinate, South Baden, and Württemberg-Hohenzollern in the French zone. Furthermore, Berlin, the former German capital, is represented by a delegation of five which may take part in the discussions but may not vote.

This constitutional convention was solemnly opened in the presence of leading Allied Military Government officials and the German ministers president in the Western zones on September 1, and is expected to sit at least until the end of October. Its debates are being held in the quarters of the Pedagogical Academy, a teachers' training college. It is an ultramodern building located on the banks of the Rhine, so that the delegates, looking through the window of the main hall, can see the ships passing up and down on this storied river.

The significance of the assembly lies in the fact that it represents the first attempt to reconstruct Germany politically since Count Schwerin-Krosig announced the capitulation of Nazi Germany at Flensburg on May 7, 1945. It is a coincidence that this gathering should be held exactly 100 years

after the Frankfort Parliament in 1848 had finally attempted to bestow a democratic constitution on the people of Germany. And almost 30 years had elapsed since the Weimar convention drafted the constitution of the first German republic.

While both Frankfort on the Main and Weimar are closely associated with the name of Goethe, the present constitution-makers of Germany are meeting in the pleasant Rhine town that is known throughout the world as the birthplace of Beethoven as well as the seat of an ancient and famous university. But there is one vital difference between the Frankfort and Weimar congresses and the gathering at Bonn. While the earlier conventions represented all of Germany, no delegates from the Soviet zone are permitted by the Russian authorities to attend the sessions of the Parliamentary Council. Bonn is therefore no German National Assembly. And although it is the most important step that has been taken since the war to obtain the political unity of Germany, the Russians and their Communist supporters are shouting from the housetops that the Bonn convention is “splitting Germany.”

The political leaders at Bonn are very sensitive about this accusation—so sensitive that they are careful to emphasize the fact that what they are doing now is laying the foundation of what they call “a provisional government of a state-fragment” and not the definitive constitution of a united Germany. This all-German constitution, they contend, can only be written when the representatives from all over the Reich can convene and when Germany's political sovereignty has been restored. And this constitution, they assert, cannot

¹ Prepared by John Elliot, Chief, Political Activities Branch, Civil Administration Division, OMCUS. This article is reprinted from the *Information Bulletin* of Oct. 5, 1948, of the U.S. Military Government in Germany.

be drafted while Germany is under Allied occupation.

This German point of view was aptly expressed by Dr. Carlo Schmid, eminent professor of political science from the University of Tübingen, in his address before the Social Democratic Congress in Dusseldorf early in September. Said Schmid:

"No definitive solution will be sought in Bonn. All who work there, at least all Social Democrats, know that only a provisional government can be created. We will be able to create a state in the true sense of the word only when an agreement of the four occupying powers has been reached concerning an all-German policy. Every other solution would be bought at the risk of a world catastrophe."

This fear of leaving themselves open to the charge of being guilty of "splitting" Germany was the cause of the protracted debate on nomenclature between the three Allied Military Governors of Western Germany and the ministers president of the 11 states. The Germans objected to calling the document which they were summoned to draw up a "constitution" as stipulated in the London agreement concluded by the United States, British, and French Governments, which constitutes the legal basis of the Bonn meeting. The Germans succeeded in getting the name changed to "Fundamental Law of a Provisional Constitution" (*Grundgesetz Vorläufige Verfassung*). Likewise, instead of labeling itself a Constitutional Convention, the Bonn gathering styles itself a Parliamentary Council.

Finally, the German ministers president objected to the proposal to have their constitution ratified at a referendum. They feared that this would give a binding character to a document—a distinction which they felt should be reserved for the definitive constitution of Germany. They pleaded that this charter should be ratified by the parliaments of the states. The Allied Military Governors in the end agreed to pass on the German objections to their respective governments, but no decision has as yet been taken on this point.

The delegates to the Bonn convention were named by the state parliaments according to the political strength of the political parties represented in them, in the ratio of one delegate to every 375,000 inhabitants. Hence, the Bonn convention

reflects the political division of Germany as recorded by the last state parliamentary elections (these were held in the United States zone in November and December 1946), and do not necessarily indicate existing German political thought.

The Bonn convention is made up as follows:

CDU/CSU	27
SPD	27
Liberals	5
Communists	2
Center Party	2
German Party	2
Total	65

It will be seen that the Parliamentary Council is dominated by the two big parties, Christian Democratic Union bloc (including its sister party, the Christian Social Union of Bavaria and the French zone) and the Social Democratic Party.

The Bavarian Party, which is today rivaling the CSU in that state, is not represented at all in the convention because it did not exist at the time of the Bavarian elections. It is a party composed of dissidents from the CSU. It represents extreme Bavarian home rule, if not separatist elements, and its failure to have a voice in the convention weakens the federalistic faction.

The Bonn convention has been organized by these two big parties. Konrad Adenauer, long time mayor of Cologne and leader of the CDU in the British zone, was unanimously elected president of the Assembly. Its deputy chairman is Adolph Schönfelder, Social Democratic president of the Hamburg Bürgerschaft.

Some of the ablest political figures of contemporary Germany are sitting in the Bonn Parliament. Besides Adenauer, the CDU is represented by Anton Pfeiffer from Bavaria, who dominated the Chiemsee meeting which drew up a list of proposals for the Bonn gathering.

The Social Democratic delegation includes Dr. Walter Menzel, the Minister of the Interior in North Rhine Westphalia, who has drawn up the Social Democratic paper on what the new constitution ought to be; Professor Bergsträsser, an authority on international law who comes from Hesse; and Carlo Schmid, who next to Dr. Kurt Schumacher is probably the dominating figure in his party.

The Democrats have sent Theodor Heuss, a vet-

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eran German liberal who was formerly Minister of Education in Württemberg-Baden.

Although the Communists have only two delegates at the convention, one of them is their leader in Western Germany—Max Reimann. He is an able and aggressive debater.

Berlin is represented by a delegation consisting of Paul Löbe, the former Reichstag president; Ernst Reuter, Otto Suhr, speaker of the Berlin City Council; Jakob Kaiser, the former CDU leader in the Eastern zone who was deposed from his office by the Russians; and Dr. Reiff of the Liberal Democratic Party.

The Communists' attitude toward the convention was laid down by Reimann in the opening meeting. They deny that the Bonn convention has any authority to draft a constitution for Western Germany. Reimann submitted a motion to the effect that the "Parliamentary Council was instituting discussions on a separate West German constitution," and warned that the Bonn meeting would have disastrous consequences on the Moscow and Berlin negotiations. After rowdy scenes that recalled the debates in the prewar German Reichstag, his motion was defeated with only the two Communists supporting it.

As in the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 that drew up the American Constitution, the principal issue at stake in the Bonn gathering revolved around the distribution of power between the central government and the states. The London agreement stipulates that the Western German government shall be federal in character, but then what is federalism? The United States Constitution, as it is interpreted and applied today, would seem perilously like an *Einheits-Staat* (unified state) to James Madison and most of the Philadelphia delegates.

The Social Democrats are the champions of a strong central government. They would like to see the Western German government have powers closely analogous to those of the Weimar Republic. Their views on the subject have been embodied in a report bearing the name of Walter Menzel, the SPD minister of the interior in the Government of North Rhine Westphalia.

The Christian Democratic-Christian Socialist bloc, on the other hand, wants a central government of limited powers with all rights not expressly given to it reserved to the states. The

Bavarians, in particular, are the exponents of the states-rights school of thought, and their ideas have found expression in the so-called "Ellwangen Document" named after the town in Württemberg where this paper was drafted by a group of Bavarian politicians last spring.

Generally speaking, it may be said that the Social Democrats represent the ideas of Alexander Hamilton so far as central government is concerned, whereas the Christian Democrats embody the Jeffersonian ideas of states' rights.

As the SPD and CDU/CSU are equally balanced in the Bonn convention, the struggle between the unionists and the federalists is likely to prove close and tense, with the issue perhaps being decided ultimately by the 11 voters of the minor parties.

The principal point at issue will probably center around what body is to raise and distribute the taxes—the central government or the states.

In the Bismarckian Reich the central government could indeed raise revenue from custom duties, but for most of its funds it was dependent upon the states. But under the Weimar Republic, the central government levied practically all the taxes, including income taxes, and distributed part of these revenues to the states, which were therefore rendered financially dependent on Berlin.

This reform, the work of the able Center Party financial expert, Matthias Erzberger, constituted what is probably the most important distinction between imperial Germany and the Weimar Republic. Bonn may witness a bitter controversy as to whether the future Western German government will adhere to the Erzberger reform or set the clock back to Bismarck's day.

Some idea of what the future constitution of Western Germany may contain, or what the chief issues are that will be fought out before the Bonn convention, may be gleaned from the majority report submitted by the Chiemsee conference. This was a body of 22 men—two from each state—appointed by the ministers president to work out a draft to be laid before the Bonn convention as a basis for its debates. These delegates met from August 10–22 in the gorgeous palace built by King Louis II of Bavaria upon an island in the middle of the idyllic Chiemsee.

The Chiemsee experts recommended that the Western German state should constitute a "state-

fragment" (*Staats-Fragment*), not a "full state" (*Vollstaat*). This was done to stress the provisional character of the Western German constitution.

This solution was chosen as the best of three alternatives. The other two possibilities were (1) creation of a Western State which it was feared would be tantamount to separation; (2) a formation of a "German federal republic" with claims to exerting its authority over all Germany, even though it was obvious that it could not make its laws effective in the Russian zone. This alternative was regarded as being too aggressive in character and was not seriously considered.

The Chiemsee majority report recommends that the states shall have control over educational and cultural affairs but that the central government shall have far-reaching powers in the matter of financial legislation. It specifies that the central government shall have exclusive legislative authority to impose custom duties and shall have priority in regard to legislation concerning income and property taxes as well as sales and consumption taxes.

It is proposed that the union shall have a bicameral parliament. The lower chamber shall be a *Bundestag* representing the people, like the American House of Representatives; while the Upper House, the *Bundesrat*, shall consist of representatives of the states. Unlike the American Congress, however, the delegates of the *Bundesrat* shall not be elected by the people, but shall be appointed by the state governments, as in the Weimar Republic.

The majority report further recommends that the executive branch of the government should be headed by a *Bundespräsident*. He is to be elected by the joint votes of the two houses of parliament just as the French president is elected by the National Assembly.

The Chiemsee experts propose that the Western German state should have the cabinet system of government as is common in Europe, in preference to the American presidential system in which the chief executive remains in power for a fixed period of time.

The Chiemsee majority report also suggests that the West German state should be called the "League of German States."

The struggle in the Bonn convention between the

unionists and the federalists is foreshadowed by two proposals concerning the text of the preamble to the constitution. According to one version, all constitutional power emanates from the German people, while according to the federalist school of thought, the source of power resides in the individual states.

Social Democratic headquarters have made it clear, however, that they did not consider the Chiemsee report as a document that had to be accepted or rejected *in toto*. Fritz Heine, the party's secretary at Hannover, said that the Chiemsee paper might well "be thrown in the wastebasket" although he conceded that some points from it might be incorporated in the future German constitution. But he declared that the SPD would never consent to the proposal that the West German state should be called a "League of German States"—a name that doubtless suggested to him a Confederation rather than a Union.

Coincident with the drafting and ratification of a constitution for Western Germany, two other important papers in accordance with the London agreement will be promulgated. One is the Occupation Statute, which will be decreed by the three Western powers. This document will serve as the Magna Carta of the people of Western Germany, defining their rights *vis-à-vis* the occupying powers.

The second will be alteration of German state boundaries which the German leaders had been authorized to make. It seems likely at present that only one such change will be made, namely the amalgamation of Baden and Württemberg. This merger would be a territorial reform all to the good, since it would correspond to the claims of both history and tradition and would create a well balanced state in southern Germany approximately equal to Lower Saxony in respect to population.

The work of the Bonn convention bids fair to be an historic milestone in Germany history. The creation of a political government for Western Germany will be an important step towards the ultimate unification of all Germany. The Western German state will be a magnetic force that will tend to attract into its orbit the part of Germany now under Russian rule. In this sense, the Western German state may well play the same role for

(Continued on page 526)

THIRD REGULAR SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

World Confidence and the Reduction of Armed Forces: The American Objective

REMARKS BY AMBASSADOR WARREN R. AUSTIN¹

U.S. Delegate to the General Assembly

I discuss the proposal of the Soviet Union for a one-third reduction in the armed forces of the permanent members of the Security Council. The question of the prohibition of atomic weapons, which is provided for in the plan of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, is now being considered by a subcommittee of this committee.

Two years ago the General Assembly of the United Nations recommended that the Security Council formulate practical measures to provide for the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. On February 13, 1947, the Security Council established for this purpose the Commission for Conventional Armaments.

It is significant that, in the year and a half of the Commission's operations, the Soviet Union found no occasion to introduce this proposal which we have before us. Furthermore, I call to the attention of this Committee the fact that nine of the eleven members of the Commission for Conventional Armaments have agreed upon what they consider the essential principles which should govern the formulation of proposals for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. The Soviet Union has not accepted these principles. Let us examine these principles in an effort to determine whether or not the proposal brought forward by the Soviet Delegate today meets the standards set by the great majority of the members of the Conventional Armaments Commission. They determined that a system of regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces can only be put into effect in an atmosphere of international confidence and security. Nine out of eleven report that one example of conditions essential to security is the establishment of an adequate system of agreements under article 43 of the Charter. This position was not limited to the United Kingdom and the United States as asserted by Byelorussia.

Is the Soviet Union prepared to permit the United Nations to have effective armed forces on the basis of the principles considered essential by the other permanent members of the Security Council? The actions of its representatives in the Military Staff Committee and the Security Council do not indicate this to be the case.

Another condition considered essential by the majority is the establishment of effective, enforceable international control of atomic energy. I hope that the Soviet Union will find it possible to accept the only system of international control and prohibition which the majority have found adequate.

Another condition essential to world confidence and security is the conclusion of the peace settlements with Japan and Germany. It is impossible for any nation to determine its military requirements for self-preservation until these conditions have been accomplished. But can conditions of confidence and security be created as long as one of the permanent members of the Security Council blocks the formulation of a lasting peace?

Can there be confidence and security when one of the permanent members of the Security Council creates a threat to peace by imposing a land blockade of Berlin?

Can there be confidence and security when one of them refuses to participate in the efforts of the Security Council to remove this threat to world peace?

Can there be confidence and security when one of them frustrates the efforts of all the other occupying powers for a pacific settlement of the dispute?

I call your attention also to the fact that the principles considered essential by nine of the eleven members of the Commission for Conventional Armaments also call for a system of adequate safeguards which, by including an agreed system of international supervision, would insure the observance of the provisions of the resolution or convention by all parties. These, too, must precede the initiation of any disarmament.

The crucial aspect of this question is the steadfast refusal of the Soviet Union, in the study of atomic-energy control and in the field of conventional armaments, to agree in common with other members to the opening of its territory to representatives of the United Nations so that they might

¹ Made before Committee I (Political and Security) in Paris on Oct. 12, 1948, and released to the press on the same date. Printed also as Department of State publication 3319.

determine whether the agreements are being carried out.

Does any member of this committee think for a moment that the Members of the United Nations should disarm while the Soviet Union gives no evidence whatsoever that it is willing to participate in the world community to the extent required for the control of atomic energy and the regulation of armaments?

In its resolution the Soviet Union proposes a system of supervision and control "within the framework of the Security Council." The objective in steering this proposal into the Security Council, with the veto as the trap door, is too obvious to permit serious consideration. Such attitude is an ancient one; the Soviet proposals for disarmament made in 1927 at Geneva were really aimed at another objective than disarmament, as shown in a resolution of the sixth congress of the Communist International:

"The aim of the Soviet proposal was not to spread pacifist illusions, but to destroy them; not to support capitalism by ignoring or toning down its shady sides, but to propagate the fundamental Marxian postulate, that disarmament and the abolition of war are possible only with the fall of capitalism. . . ."

I ask again—Why has Mr. Vyshinsky presented his proposal to this body instead of to the Commission for Conventional Armaments? Could it possibly be for propaganda effect?

The world situation is too grave to permit any further play with words. I say this deliberately after listening to hour after hour of Soviet oratory. In a most revealing manner our Soviet colleagues have, during the past two weeks, exposed to us not only the vanity of such word structures but also their emptiness.

Mr. Vyshinsky has mentioned his aversion to war. He has, in particular, depicted at great length the horrors of atomic warfare. He has freely—very freely—in quoting from one of his favorite American magazines translated the expression "technical improvement" into the word "progress" on the part of the United States in manufacturing even deadlier atomic bombs than that used at Hiroshima. He has then proceeded to wave this distorted example of American inventiveness in the face of dismayed and already overwrought mankind.

Is it not strange that in this "paean of peace" he has placed the accent on atomic warfare? Consistently he has dwelt on the frightful effects of the ever bigger and better atomic bombs which he generously attributes to American resourcefulness and efficiency. Is it not strange that except for a word here and a sentence there he has not placed the accent on war, just plain war? Is it not curious that, instead of concentrating his ire

on that desperately out-of-date ultimate instrument of the policy of nations, he has confined his highest flights of oratory purely to atomic warfare?

I accept the recent challenge of my Soviet colleague to study Marxian teaching as currently expounded today in the Soviet Union for the answer. Aggressive warfare in the Soviet Socialist officialdom has not yet fallen into disrepute. For the time being only atomic warfare is to be dreaded and avoided at all costs. Indeed war itself is still a recognized means of achieving a Communist world society.

The Soviet Union for more than a year has pretended to devote itself to a so-called "peace offensive". Mr. Vyshinsky has spoken much of the peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union as contrasted to the alleged warlike and aggressive intentions of the United States. Yet by what evidence are we to judge the peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union?

In the first place there is a vast Communist literature which reveals much concerning the intentions of the Soviet Union. If these writings are outdated, not valid, or do not represent the policy of the Soviet Union, assurance of that fact, followed by concrete action, would begin to remove the apprehensions felt by many seated about this table. But until that time we have no recourse other than to accept as valid the statements which have been made repeatedly by authoritative representatives of the Soviet Union.

We hope it is not true that the Soviet Union believes and acts on the premise that a conflict between Russia and the Western World is inevitable, and we hope that Mr. Vyshinsky can assure us that such is not the case.

Yet the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, a book whose tenth anniversary of publication was celebrated last month in Moscow, which has been printed in 62 languages and distributed in more than 33 million copies, states that "Lenin has pointed out that war is an inevitable concomitant of capitalism." This history, which is taught the length and breadth of the Soviet Union, teaches that there are just wars, wars which are waged, for example, "to liberate the people from capitalist slavery."

In a book published in 1947 entitled *The Economy of the U.S.S.R. During World War II*, the Deputy Premier of the U.S.S.R. and Chief of the State Planning Commission states as follows:

"Lenin and Stalin warned the Socialist homeland again of the inevitability of historical battles between imperialism and socialism and prepared the peoples of the U.S.S.R. for these battles. Lenin and Stalin explained that wars which a working class, having defeated its own bourgeoisie, wages in the interests of its socialist homeland and in the interests of strengthening and developing socialism, are lawful and holy wars. . . ."

"To prevent the possibility of appearance within a future period of new imperialist aggression against the Socialist homeland, and the beginning of a third world war, it is necessary that the aggressor imperialist countries be disarmed militarily and economically, and that the anti-imperialist democratic countries rally together. It should not be forgotten that the capitalist economic system abroad of itself produces aggressive wars and the leaders of such wars. . . ."

Finally, Mr. Chairman, as recently as September 22, 1948, the Soviet newspaper *Izvestia* stated:

"The capitalist system is doomed to destruction. However, the downfall of capitalism will not come of itself. Capitalism can only be destroyed in a fierce class struggle."

If the Soviet Union regards those governments which do not subscribe to Communism as the representatives of the "capitalism" it seeks to destroy, then how can we avoid feeling apprehensive? When we hear Soviet representatives talk about the peace offensive, we recall that in April 1948 a Communist Party publication in Paris defined "final victory over war" as "victory over capitalism". Is this not a ghastly definition of peace?

It is clear that in the Soviet Union war is not only regarded as inevitable but is actually glorified by its cultural leaders.

Issue no. 44 of the *Literary Gazette*, which, like all Soviet publications, carries official sanction, only two years ago stated the following:

"We do not intend to abandon the war theme. . . . We must write about war in such a way that the generation of young Soviet people which come after us will love arms and be ready for battles and victories."

Perhaps Mr. Vyshinsky can show us that official utterances, some of them made less than a month ago, were not intended to mean what they say. Perhaps Mr. Vyshinsky can withdraw the thesis that a war between the Soviet Union and the capitalist countries is inevitable and that Communism teaches that our system must be destroyed. Until he does, however, we cannot ignore the warnings in the writings of Soviet authorities.

So much for Soviet philosophy and the peace of mind which it may inspire in their non-Marxist neighbors.

Now let us briefly consider whether peace of mind can be assured by the past actions of the U.S.S.R.

The aggrandizement of Soviet territory has already been referred to. Indignantly the Soviet Delegation has asserted that these annexations had been effected with democratic consultations of the populations according to the enlightened standards of the Soviet Constitution. Does this statement

stand analysis? Even more, does it stand the test of Mr. Vyshinsky's beloved "critique"? Let us consider eastern Poland. Somehow I seem to remember that the democratic processes of annexation started in September 1939 by a sudden overnight military offensive against an already defeated foe. This conquest was conducted in full harmony and technical cooperation with the Nazis. The Soviet Union approved by the stroke of a pen on August 23 of that year the alliance, and suddenly became a working partner with the oft-denounced Nazis. And did not Generalissimo Stalin, after the Nazi-Soviet partition of Poland, telegraph to Ribbentrop, the Nazi Foreign Minister: "The friendship of the people of Germany and the Soviet Union, cemented by blood, has every reason to be lasting and firm." As to the "democratic" ratification of the inclusion of this large part of prewar Poland in the Soviet Union by the populations themselves, we learn little (and I think we all would keenly be interested to hear) about details thereof from the Soviet Delegation. However, it really should not be necessary to seek far for enlightenment. Any nation, any individual with any kind of experience of universal suffrage does not have to be told a great deal about the democratic character of elections and plebiscites which yield 99-percent results.

The Baltic States also began on their "voluntary" road to incorporation by the arrival of the Red Army in the fall of 1939, followed by their complete takeover after the French campaign of 1940, at a time when there was no question of liberating these small countries from an enemy yoke. We recall that the entrance of the Latvian Republic into the Soviet Union was presided over by no less a person than my distinguished colleague, Mr. Vyshinsky.

Let us pass on down the years. First, we encounter the "great hope", the hope generated in the bosom of every generous human being when the embattled Russian people played such a great part in defeating Nazi Germany, when hope was kindled that the relentless doctrines of Marx and of Lenin, doctrines of hatred between classes and also of inevitable strife, had made way for a more enlightened concept of relations between men and states.

For a long while most people clung tenaciously to this hope, unwilling to yield and abandon their vision that a new world, at last better, with unlimited possibilities for the future, had dawned. They insisted on disbelieving the evidence. Gradually the realization developed that, indeed, nothing was changed.

Is it really necessary to go into details regarding the domination of Rumania, Poland, Hungary, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia? Recent events in truly impressive detail have disclosed that the price of Soviet friendship is complete subservience to Soviet policy.

The satellites of the U.S.S.R. were not alone to feel the heavy hand of its constant drive for world power, a drive camouflaged by words appropriated from liberty's lexicon, words of vital meaning to those who enjoy freedom, but deceptive and meaningless in the Russian policy toward her satellites.

Cause for disillusionment and alarm also exists in the Orient, as the distinguished representative of China gave testimony yesterday. There, too, Communist directives preach war and bloodshed, which facts confirm. In a lengthy resolution adopted by the sixth world congress of Communist International at Moscow on September 1, 1928, the following directive concerning China is found:

"The Communist Party (in China) must everywhere propagate among the masses the idea of Soviets, the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, and the inevitability of the coming revolutionary mass armed uprising."

That "mass armed uprising" preached from Moscow in 1928 is now in full swing. The people of Manchuria after long years under Japanese domination and after having their factories despoiled of equipment by the Soviet Army are now suffering untold hardships from armed Chinese Communist forces who are seeking by force to destroy the constituted authority of China, whose representatives sit here among us today as fellow members. These Communist forces have also penetrated into the heart of China seeking to destroy and despoil. Another dangerous development has occurred. The U.S.S.R. obtained as part of its price for entering the war against Japan special positions at Port Arthur and Dairen, Chinese territory, which have been so utilized effectively to bar China from exercising its legal authority.

In Korea, where a people of 30,000,000 held high hopes for complete independence at the end of the war in the Orient in September 1945, those hopes have been and are being betrayed through Soviet opposition to any rational solution. That opposition moreover has been maintained in complete disregard of a resolution adopted by the General Assembly on November 14, 1947, providing a fair and honorable solution of the Korean problem. Can the Korean people look forward with equanimity to any solution when a large Soviet-trained armed force awaits in North Korea an opportunity to march southward?

The states of western Europe have also been the victims of this new form of aggression. The Cominform was formed so as better to correlate the work of destruction to be accomplished. At all costs western Europe must not regain its feet, for should it do so it would successfully resist Communist penetration. At all costs the homeland of Western civilization must be kept in a constant

state of turmoil and economic chaos. It must be kept in a state of fear and worry, so as to be unable to concentrate on the great task of reconstruction. The economic blood transfusion from the United States must at all costs be nullified by recurring strikes and curtailed production. The Communist Parties of France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg received their orders accordingly, and with the unreasoning discipline which is one of the many terrifying aspects of modern Communism the various Communist Parties proceeded to execute this deliberate plan of sabotage.

Overnight the Communist slogan was no longer "work and produce" as it had been in the first post-liberation period. As soon as it became obvious that returning health would protect these bodies politically against the Communist views the new slogan became "destroy and wreck."

Perhaps most surprising of all is the complete brazenness with which these so-called national parties admit their allegiance to a foreign power.

We have had a striking illustration right here in Paris since this General Assembly convened. The official Communist organ, *Humanité*, on October 1 published the following statement by the Politburo: "The people of France will never fight the Soviet Union." Let us ponder exactly what this means. A French political party declares openly that it will never participate in a war against another nation and this regardless of the circumstances under which a conflict might develop. For "my country right or wrong" the Communists of all lands now substitute "the U.S.S.R. right or wrong."

Are we dreaming? Can such tactics, such actions, such a record be those of one of the founders of the United Nations? Harking back to that day of hope, June 26, 1945, when the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed the Charter, what a crashing discord in the world's hymn of peace. Perhaps this apparent contradiction can best be explained by a quotation from Lenin with reference to Communist penetration of trade-unions (Left-wing Communism, an infantile disorder): "It is necessary to be able to withstand all this, to agree to any and every sacrifice, and even—if need be—to resort to all sorts of stratagems, maneuvers and illegal methods, to evasion and subterfuges in order to penetrate the trade unions, to remain in them and to carry on Communist work in them at all costs."

Let us for a few moments refresh our memories so as better to judge the record against the lofty purposes so well set forth in the Charter's preamble and first two articles:

WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS
DETERMINED

to save succeeding generations from the scourge of

Department of State Bulletin

war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
 to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and
 to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and
 to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

AND FOR THESE ENDS

to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and
 to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and
 to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and
 to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples,

HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS.

Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations.

Article 1

The Purposes of the United Nations are:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and

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4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

Article 2

The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.

1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.
2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.

6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

With complete candor, I shall now speak about the security situation in which we must consider the proposal of the Soviet Union for a one-third reduction of armed forces. In doing so, I quote from a statement that Secretary of State Marshall made before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives of the United States on May 5, 1948. He said that—

"When universal agreement to the Charter was achieved, the strength of the major powers in relation to one another was such that no one of them could safely break the peace if the others stood united in defense of the Charter. Under existing world circumstances the maintenance of a comparable power relationship is fundamental to world security."

To what extent did the United States demobi-

lize? Let me cite the statement made by Secretary Marshall before the Women's National Press Club in Washington on July 1, 1947:

"... At the end of the war our government demobilized the greatest concentration of military power that the world has ever seen. Our armed strength was deployed from the Elbe in Germany to the Islands of Japan. This great array was demobilized with amazing rapidity until only comparatively small garrisons of troops were left on the necessary occupation duty in the principal enemy countries. No conditions were attached to this withdrawal. . . . No political parties subservient to United States interests have been left behind in European countries to attempt conquest of governments from within. No American agents have sought to dominate the police establishment of European countries. No 'joint American-European companies' have been forced upon reluctant governments. I do not cite this record as evidence of our peaceful intentions by way of indulging in national boasting, but merely because it is true. . . ."

During this period it has become progressively clearer that serious misconceptions prevail in the minds of the leaders of the Soviet Union. It is a misconception to suppose that differing systems cannot live side by side in peace under the basic rules of international conduct prescribed by the Charter of the United Nations. These rules are obligatory upon all Members.

The United Nations must dispel these misconceptions of the Soviet leaders. It must bring about a more realistic view of what is possible and what is impossible in the relationship between the Soviet Union and the world at large. This will restore to international society the equilibrium necessary to permit the United Nations to function as contemplated at San Francisco.

The United States realized the need for this equilibrium. The first necessary step was to insure the freedom and independence of the Members of the United Nations. The ability of democratic peoples to preserve their independence in the face of totalitarian threats depends upon their determination to do so. That determination in turn depends upon the development of a healthy economic and political life and a genuine sense of security.

The United States Government, therefore, is responding to requests to provide economic assistance to various countries in Europe and elsewhere. The United States is cooperating with 16 European countries in a recovery program providing for self-help and mutual aid.

In addition the United States Government is now considering the steps necessary to bring the national military establishment to the minimum level required for international security.

Action necessary on the part of the United States to restore this balance-of-power relationship may be less onerous than for some other nations which are already spending a very large percentage of their national income on armaments. The United States for the fiscal year 1948-49 is spending only 5.9 percent of its national income for military purposes, despite the fact that this represents some increase over the low point since the war. This is to be compared with the figure of 17 percent for the Soviet Union mentioned by Mr. MacNeil the other day.

Gentlemen, I repeat that, until present conditions of world fear and insecurity are replaced by an atmosphere of international confidence and security, not only will it be impossible to institute effective systems of control and reduction of armaments but the whole field of international relations will be subject to continuous discord.

The people of the United States are deeply interested in the reduction of national armaments and are prepared to consider most carefully any *bona fide* proposal for lightening the burden of armaments. As a matter of fact, however, the United States disarmed too far and too fast after the last war. The overriding consideration is the maintenance of international peace and security. We know that maintenance of this international peace and security depends upon strength and resolution of those states who in the final analysis are prepared to act in support of the world community against aggression.

Indeed, the security of many nations seated at this table depends upon this fundamental fact. The world learned from Germany and Japan what can happen when leading members of the international community are or are thought to be lacking in strength or resolution. I call upon the Soviet Union to work with us to reduce world tension and to dispel the dread and suspicion which are filling the lives of so many of our peoples and making our efforts for world organization so difficult.

Before closing I wish to state that the Delegation of the United States has considered carefully and will vote for the resolutions which have been submitted to this committee by the Delegations of the United Kingdom and Syria.² Taken together these resolutions are entirely consistent with the position of the United States. Article 26 of the Charter provides "that— . . . the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating . . . plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments."

Despite the fact that the work of this Commission has continued to be hampered by the demagogic appeals and irresponsible propaganda of the Soviet Union, the United States believes that the Commission must proceed with its work.

² A/C.1/319 of Oct. 10, 1948, and A/C.1/309 of Oct. 1, 1948.

Discussion of the Palestine Situation in Committee I

STATEMENT BY RALPH BUNCHE¹

Acting U.N. Mediator in Palestine

It is with heavy heart that I make this statement to the Committee today. But for that crime in Jerusalem committed by a band of despicable gangsters it would be Count Bernadotte himself who would be speaking to you now. The late mediator was not only my chief but a treasured friend. In these months since the end of May, I had come to know him well. He was an utterly honest and fearless man, completely independent in his thinking, and thoroughly devoted to the effort to bring peace to Palestine. He had no axe to grind, no vested interest to serve. The views which I will briefly express to you today will, I think, be very close to the views which Count Bernadotte himself would have expressed had he lived to enjoy the privilege of sitting with you, a privilege which he would have greatly appreciated.

The progress report of the late mediator which is before you as document A/648, sets forth quite clearly in part one the views of Count Bernadotte on the main issues in the Palestine conflict today.² I need not repeat these views, and the more so since I am in full accord with them. If I may take the liberty of doing so, however, I would like briefly to give some emphasis to what appears to me to be the inescapable logic of the situation in Palestine with which this Assembly is now confronted.

Since the termination of the mandate on May 15 of this year, there have been three signal developments in Palestine:—The proclamation of a Jewish state, resort to forceful measures by the Arab states, and the intervention of the Security Council.

1. A Jewish state was proclaimed in that part of Palestine envisaged for the Jewish state in the resolution of the General Assembly of last November 29. That Jewish state did not come about in accordance with the processes and procedures foreseen in the Assembly's resolution. But it was no less real because of that and it could confidently base its right to exist on the fact that the majority of the Members of the United Nations had endorsed the idea of a Jewish state in Palestine, a mandated territory and therefore an international responsibility, moreover, this was no nominal or paper state. From the very day of its proclamation it had a vibrant reality. It boasted an active and vigorous government, a national *esprit* and cohesion, and a well organized and well trained, if poorly equipped, army. It was a going concern

from the day of its birth. It was readily apparent to even the casual observer that the nationalist spirit of the Jewish inhabitants of this state was so strong and deeply rooted as to render entirely illusory any suggestion that a Jewish state in Palestine could be prevented by any means other than force of sufficient strength to completely crush the Jewish community. In the five months since its inception, this Jewish state has consolidated and strengthened its position, both nationally and internationally.

2. On the other hand, Arab opposition to the new Jewish state was so intense as to induce the Arab states to resort to violent measures. Open warfare between the newly proclaimed Jewish state and the states members of the Arab League broke out coincidentally with the termination of the mandate and the proclamation of the Jewish state. This, of course, had not been envisaged by the resolution of November 29. Until halted by the two truces achieved through the intervention of the Security Council, it was warfare as deadly as it could be made with the limited weapons and supplies available to the contestants. It was warfare brought on by the fact that the Jews had taken the political offensive on the termination of the mandate and proclaimed a state, while the Arab states, in retaliation, took the military offensive and moved their troops into Palestine with the avowed purpose of protecting the Arab inhabitants of Palestine by crushing the infant Jewish state. This military effort was exerted not by the Arabs of Palestine but primarily by the armies of the Arab states with the objective of protecting the Arabs of Palestine from an alleged danger of Jewish domination. It cannot be said that the Arabs had not given ample warning of their firm intentions in this regard. Their willingness to resort to this extreme action is an accurate gauge of the intensity of Arab feelings as regards the injustice to them of a Jewish state in Palestine.

3. By the intervention of the Security Council the warfare in Palestine has been twice stopped and at present remains stopped. In fact, the resolution of the Security Council of July 15, 1948, which ordered both parties to cease fighting, al-

¹ Made on Oct. 15, 1948, and printed from telegraphic text.

² For conclusions of the report, see BULLETIN of Oct. 3, 1948, p. 436.

though it makes reference to a truce of undefined duration, also prohibits any further recourse to military action as a means of settling the dispute. The imposed "truce" of July 18 is really a permanent cease-fire order. The opposing armies have now been confronting each other since July 18, but they are forbidden to resume fighting. If either side should provoke a resumption of hostilities it would have to do so in open defiance of the order of the Security Council and thereby run the risk of invoking the threat of sanctions embodied in the July 15 resolution. The Security Council order stands and it cannot be assumed that either side will wish to run the risk of shouldering responsibility for open defiance of this order by a deliberate resumption of hostilities. On the other hand, this permanent cease-fire order, which is also described in the resolution as a truce, has been regarded by both parties as a truce, and therefore of temporary rather than permanent duration. Moreover, it has been administered and supervised as a truce. The armies have not been withdrawn or demobilized. On the contrary, they have been confronting each other in full battle array, and alerted for battle, for almost five months now, except for the intense fighting during the nine day interval between the two truces. The strain and tension are very great, and it is most assuredly not a situation which can be maintained indefinitely. The existing truce clearly must be superseded by something more durable and secure—either a formal peace or an armistice, either of which would be more consistent with the Security Council order than the present precarious truce.

It is unthinkable that Arabs and Jews should be permitted to resume hostilities in Palestine. The threat to the peace of the Middle East generally and even to the world from conflict in Palestine, is far too great.

There have already been some danger signals of outside interests in the conflict, which might render doubtful any assumption that a renewed conflict could be confined to Palestinians and the Arab states.

The role of mediator was defined in resolution 186 (S-2) of the General Assembly of May 14, 1948. Among other functions that resolution directed the mediator to "use his good offices to promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine". This was the function to which Count Bernadotte devoted major concentration from the beginning of his effort in Cairo on May 28, although the supervision of the truce under the resolution of the Security Council, and more recently, the tragic refugee problem, consumed much of his time and energy.

In directing his attention towards achieving a peaceful adjustment of the Palestine situation, the mediator was confronted with the necessity of defining the premises upon which his efforts would

be based. His decision in this regard was a practical one, dictated in large measure by circumstances entirely beyond his control.

Arab representatives, for example, with whom he consulted frequently and at great length, constantly emphasized what they would describe as the historic injustice of the Balfour Declaration, the terms of the mandate, the mandate itself, the Jewish nationalist aspirations, and the resolution of the General Assembly of 29 November on the one hand, and the fundamental equality and democracy of an Arab state in the whole of Palestine on the other. Count Bernadotte, however, quite rightly in my view, did not regard it as within his purview to pass judgment upon the validity and the justice of decisions previously taken by the international community. On the same grounds, and, in view of the nature of his terms of reference, for instance, he did not consider himself to be rigidly bound by the details of the resolution of the General Assembly of 29 November but recognized, nevertheless, that its basic conclusions represented the expressed will of more than two thirds of the members of the United Nations, and could not, therefore, be ignored.

It is undeniable, therefore, that in his approach to the problem, Count Bernadotte was inevitably influenced by the fact that, Arab opposition notwithstanding, there had been, especially during the past 30 years, a progressive recognition by the international community of a special position for the Jewish community in Palestine, culminating in the resolution of 29 November and the proclamation by the Jews themselves of a state of their own in a part of Palestine.

On the other hand, the mediator was not influenced by that part of the claims of the Jews to a historic right to Palestine based upon their ancient residence in that country and their religious association with it, rather than formal international sanctions. He did not accept, therefore, the Jewish contention that it was they who were always called upon to compromise. Since he could not accept their alleged historical claims to the whole of Palestine, including Transjordan, he could not admit the contention that acceptance of the 29 November resolution constituted a compromise on their part, and that any alteration in the terms of that resolution not favorable to them would compound a compromise previously made.

It was within this *milieu* that the mediator, through four months of negotiation of unprecedented intensity, strove, by trial and error, through reason and persuasion and every other honorable means, to find a common ground upon which the conflicting parties might meet. This common ground was never found. That it was not found was due entirely to the intransigence of the parties. On the fundamental issues, each side remained adamant.

In view of this fact, the mediator was forced to the conclusion that it was not now possible, by means of an intermediary, to bring the two parties together and achieve agreement between them. The Arab representatives steadfastly refused to meet the Jewish representatives, either in the presence of the mediator or otherwise, since they considered any such step as a tacit admission on their part of the right of the Jewish state to exist.

The mediator, however, did not conclude from these facts that the problem of Palestine cannot be solved by peaceful means, or that a basis for agreement between the parties can never be found. Failure to bring the parties together would, it is true, preclude any immediate possibility of a tidy, definitive solution, which is very much to be desired. But there was an alternative which derived precisely from the very rigidity of the parties who were at the same time in the predicament of having to defy the Security Council in order to resort to the simple expedient of trial by force of arms.

It was with this in mind that the mediator pointed out in paragraph 10 on page 4 of his report that:

"Although it cannot be said that neither side will fight again under any circumstances, I am strongly of the view that the time is ripe for a settlement. I am reasonably confident that given the permanent injunction against military action issued by the Security Council, and firm political decisions by the General Assembly, both sides will acquiesce, however reluctantly, in any reasonable settlement on which is placed the stamp of approval of the United Nations. I do not mean to imply that there is at the moment bright prospect for formal agreement between the two parties. But, in my opinion, although such formal agreement would be highly desirable, it is not indispensable to a peaceful settlement at this stage. What is indispensable is that the General Assembly take a firm position on the political aspects of the problem in the light of all the circumstances since its last session, and that its resolution be so reasonable as to discourage any attempt to thwart it and to defy the Security Council order by the employment of armed force."

It was on the basis of this assumption also that the mediator considered it highly essential that the question of Palestine come before the General Assembly at this time and that the political aspects of the problem be reviewed and unequivocally pronounced upon in the light of all the relevant factors.

In my opinion, in the present circumstances, two needs are uppermost in the most imperative sense. The first of these needs is a reasonable basis for the assumption that neither party will again resort to force in order to make its views prevail and as a means of gaining its objectives. In this regard, reason for hope is to be found in the fact that

settlement by force has been tried and has been checked. I do not find it possible to believe that either side wishes to resume hostilities or that either side has found settlement by force of arms a profitable expedient. Despite the conflict which has raged in Palestine and despite the gulf which still divides the antagonists, there is on both sides a desire and a need for peace arising from the fact that war is a costly, even disastrous, interruption in the normal course of development of both Arab and Jewish communities in the Middle East.

The second of these needs is for the General Assembly, as the representative body of the international community, to set forth its position on the following fundamental political issues affecting this former mandated territory with regard to which its responsibility continues:

- A. Permanent peace in Palestine.
- B. The Jewish state in Palestine.
- C. The general configurations of the boundaries of such a state.
- D. International guarantee for such boundaries.
- E. The future status of Jerusalem.
- F. The disposition of the Arab-controlled area of Palestine.
- G. Guarantees for the rights of all inhabitants of Palestine.
- H. The repatriation and resettlement of Arab refugees.
- I. The nature of the machinery to be employed as a vehicle for continuing United Nations intervention in the problem until all of its major aspects are finally disposed of.

It would not appear essential in this regard that a detailed plan, a blueprint, be devised for this purpose. Indeed, any such detailed scheme, in view of all the developments since last November, and the present situation in Palestine, might well be undesirable. Assuming always that the parties do not again resort to force, it would seem that a somewhat general treatment of the subject, which while making clear the position of the United Nations on major issues would leave to the parties the burden of peaceful adjustment, might have great merit.

The conclusions set forth in part one of the mediator's report might well provide a basis for a general treatment of this kind. These conclusions represent the constructive deductions which Count Bernadotte had arrived at on the basis of his extensive and fruitful consultation on the problem over a period of four months. He did not presume to present them as recommendations to any organ of the United Nations. As the mediator's report points out in paragraph 13 on page 5, these conclusions were designed of settlement and conciliation of the differences between the two parties. It was, indeed, his intention to renew in Paris his consultations with the representatives of the parties in pursuance of the elusive objective of mutual

agreement between them. It was his thought that if the conclusions set forth in the report could not be accepted by Arabs and Jews as a basis for discussion they still would be available to the General Assembly for such use as it might see fit to make of them. Count Bernadotte harbored no illusions, that either Arabs or Jews would embrace the conclusions in their entirety, nor did he deem it essential for them to do so, however desirable that might be. He was convinced, as I am convinced, that the

voice of the United Nations speaks with considerable authority in Palestine; this voice, in truth, was the sole foundation of his effort and his unchallengeable achievements.

At the appropriate time, should the Committee desire it, I would be pleased to present a statement dealing exclusively with the conclusions in the report and giving an explanation and elaboration of each of them, and also the answer to any question regarding the report.

The United States in the United Nations

[October 15-22]

The Roll of the United States

George F. Kennan, in his address before the Herald-Tribune Forum on October 20,¹ stated that if we mean business in our determination to make the United Nations work, we must remember that we have before us a task "as difficult and as arduous as any that this country has ever tackled in peace or in war". If that is our purpose, he said, then we must shape and align the realities of international life so that they "speak for themselves with an eloquence greater than words—that they convince the skeptical as words have thus far failed to do, that the road of international collaboration is after all the fastest, the most practical, and the safest of the paths of national policy. And where people are not open to argument on considerations of the common good, then they must be shown that this same conclusion flows even from the narrowest and most embittered sense of self-interest, which it does.

"This is the job we have to do.

"It is not, in reality, a new task, or one that lies only before us. We have already been deeply engaged in it for a long time.

"And it is not our task alone. It is a responsibility which we share with the other peace-loving nations of the world. It is entirely fallacious to regard the differences which now separate the United States and the Soviet Union merely as a struggle between those two powers. The conflict which exists inside the United Nations is not a conflict between the United States and the U.S.S.R. It is a conflict between the majority of the U.N. members, acting in support of the Charter, and a group of governments who refuse to abide

by its provisions or to recognize the over-riding international obligation which the Charter constitutes.

"We have now reached one of the most complicated and delicate phases of this long and difficult effort. We have been compelled to place before the United Nations a matter of great seriousness which it had proven impossible to compose by peaceful means outside of the United Nations. We were aware that this would constitute a severe test of the organization, and one which we would have preferred to have spared it. But we had no alternatives other than to meet the threat of force with action in order to break the blockade of Berlin, or to do nothing at all and thus permit this threatening situation to develop in an ominous silence and uncertainty, conducive to every sort of alarmist speculation and hysteria.

"This is a situation which is easy neither for us nor for our friends. It is going to take all we can bring to it in the way of steadiness and understanding and mutual confidence. But we must always understand that on the successful resolution of it there hangs more than the removal of restrictions on the supply of a single city; there hangs the removal of one more great obstacle on the road to a world in which international organization can really function."

The Berlin Crisis

A resolution aimed at peaceful solution of the Berlin crisis was presented to the Security Council in Paris on October 22 by six neutral nations (Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, and Syria) which have been striving to solve the problem since it was posed by the United States, Great Britain, and France.

The text of the resolution follows:

The Security Council having carefully considered the series of events which have led to the present grave situa-

¹ For the complete text of Mr. Kennan's address, see Department of State press release 853 of Oct. 20, 1948.

tion in Berlin, conscious of the council's primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and acting in accordance with Article 40 of the Charter in order to prevent an aggravation of the situation in Berlin, in particular, by preparing the way to its settlement, calls upon the four governments who have responsibilities in Germany and in Berlin as the occupying powers—France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

1. To prevent any incident which would be of a nature such as to aggravate the present situation in Berlin,

2. To put into effect, simultaneously, namely on the day of notification of this resolution to the four governments concerned, the steps required for the fulfilment of points (a) and (b), which are set forth hereunder:

(a) Immediate removal by all parties of all restrictions on communications, transport, and commerce between Berlin and the Western zones of Germany, and the restrictions on transport and commerce to and from the Soviet zones of Germany, it being understood that said restrictions are the ones applied by the parties after the first day of March 1948.

(b) An immediate meeting of the four military governors to arrange for the unification of currency in Berlin on the basis of the German mark of the Soviet zone. The four military governors will fix the conditions for the introduction, circulation and continued use of the German mark of the Soviet zone, as sole currency for the whole of Berlin, and to arrange for the withdrawal of the Western mark.

All the foregoing to be in accordance with the terms and conditions defined in the joint directive delivered to the four military governors in Berlin, agreed upon by the four governments in Moscow, and issued on 30 August, 1948, and to be carried out under the control of the quadripartite financial commission, whose organization, powers and responsibilities are therein described.

This measure must be totally fulfilled by the date indicated in Paragraph (c).

(c) The date referred to in the last part of paragraph (b) shall be the 20th November 1948.

3. Within 10 days following the fulfilment of the measures provided for in Section Two, or on such date as is mutually agreed between the four governments, to reopen the negotiations in the Council of Foreign Ministers on all outstanding problems concerning Germany as a whole.

Palestine

The Security Council on October 19 ordered a halt to the fighting between Israeli and Egyptian forces over supply routes to the Negev area in southern Palestine. The Council also reminded the parties in the Palestine dispute of their obligations under the Council's blanket cease-fire orders. The last such order, dated August 19, was unconditional and had no time limit.

The Council met at the request of Acting U.N. Mediator Ralph Bunche after U.N. truce officials failed through their own efforts to halt the Negev clashes.

The resolution adopted by the Council on the Negev fighting was submitted by Syria and embodied Dr. Bunche's recommendations. The first part of the resolution, ordering the immediate cease-fire, was adopted unanimously. The rest of the resolution was adopted by a 9-0 vote, the Soviet Union and the Ukraine abstaining.

The resolution calls on both Israeli and Egyptian forces to withdraw from any positions not

occupied at the time of the Negev outbreak, which began on October 15. Conditions governing the passage of supply convoys to the Jewish settlements in the Negev are to be set by U.N. truce officials and both sides are required to negotiate, either directly or through U.N. truce machinery, any outstanding problems.

The Council reaffirmed its previous all-Palestine cease-fire orders by adopting unanimously the joint Chinese-British resolution submitted last week. It calls on the Palestine parties to ensure the safety of U.N. personnel and their ready access to all places where their duties require them to go, including airfields and ports. It also calls on the parties to do their utmost to bring to justice all persons assaulting U.N. personnel. A Soviet amendment accepted by the Council adds that U.N. observers should not go beyond objective reports to the Council.

On October 21 Dr. Bunche set Friday noon (GMT) as the deadline for Israeli and Egyptian forces fighting in the Negev, Palestine's southern desert, to cease fire. The Security Council had previously issued the cease-fire order.

Dr. Bunche transmitted the deadline by cable simultaneously to the Israeli and Egyptian Governments through U.N. Representatives in Tel Aviv and Cairo.

Atomic Energy Resolution Adopted

Committee I completed its work on the atomic energy question on October 20 by approving, 41 to 6, with 10 absentions, a four-point Canadian proposals, as amended, to continue consultations aimed at establishing an effective system of international control and outlawing atomic weapons. This proposal will go to the General Assembly, where a two-thirds majority is required for adoption.

The General Assembly

Having examined the first, second and third reports of the Atomic Energy Commission which have been transmitted to it by the Security Council in accordance with the terms of the General Assembly resolution of 24 January 1946:

1. Approves the general findings (part II C) and recommendations (part III) of the first report and the specific proposals of part II of the second report of the commission as constituting the necessary basis for establishing an effective system of international control of atomic energy to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes and for the elimination from national armaments of weapons in accordance with the terms of reference of the AEC.

2. Expresses its deep concern at the impasse which has been reached in the work of the AEC as shown in its third report and regrets that unanimous agreement has not yet been reached.

3. Requests the six sponsors of the General Assembly resolution of the 24th of January, 1946, who are permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission, to meet together and consult in order to determine if there exists a basis for agreement on international control of atomic energy to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes and for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and to report to the General Assembly results of their consultation not later than its next regular session.

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THE UNITED NATIONS AND SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

4. Meanwhile the General Assembly calls upon the AEC to resume its sessions, to survey its program of work, and to proceed to the further study of such of the subjects remaining in the program of work as it considers to be practicable and useful.

The effect of the resolution is to turn the stalemated issue of atomic energy control over to the United States, U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, France, China, and Canada to see whether they can find a basis for agreement between now and the time when the General Assembly meets for its next regular session.

The resolution as adopted is a revision of the proposal originally submitted by Canada and reported out by a special subcommittee. The original draft would have left the issue to the five major powers and Canada to solve the impasse created by the Soviet Union, and would have directed them to report at the next regular session. Meanwhile, the Atomic Energy Commission itself would have been inactive.

In announcing the United States' acceptance of the wishes of the other nations, Ambassador Austin emphasized that in agreeing to the revision, the United States was not retreating from its oft-stated view that the solution to the control impasse is outside the AEC's competence and "that other means of establishing cooperation must be explored".

Non-Self-Governing Territories

At a meeting of the Trusteeship Council in Paris on October 18 the United States supported an Indian resolution calling on states administering non-self-governing territories to notify the General Assembly of changes in territorial constitutional position or status resulting in discontinuance of transmission of information called for under provisions of the Charter.

The resolution was adopted by a vote of 29 to 0, with 17 abstentions, after a Polish attempt to broaden the resolution and Belgian efforts to limit it were rejected.

Terming the resolution "logical and proper," Francis B. Sayre, U. S. Delegate said:

"The United States now transmits voluntarily information regarding the development of institutions of self-government within its territories. Even in the absence of such a resolution, the United States would expect to inform the United Nations of any change in constitutional position and status of any of its territories as a result of which it believed it unnecessary in respect to such territory to transmit further information under the Charter, and in so doing to give such accompanying information as might be appropriate. In voting for this resolution, it is the understanding of my Government that transmission of the information requested does not alter the right of each administering state to determine constitutional position and status of any particular territory under its sovereignty".

Cooperation Resolution

The five major powers found themselves in agreement on October 21 as each expressed support for a Mexican resolution appealing to the great powers to "redouble their efforts, in a spirit of solidarity and mutual understanding, to achieve in the briefest possible time final settlement of the war and the conclusion of all peace treaties".

Unqualified support for the resolution was voiced by the United States, the United Kingdom, and China. The Soviet Union and France also endorsed the resolution but suggested rewording. In addition, seven other nations spoke for adoption of the Mexican appeal.

The United States was the first of the great powers to speak out in favor of the Mexican resolution, the speaker being John Foster Dulles, of the U.S. Delegation. The statement was Mr. Dulles' first at a formal meeting of the current General Assembly.

Mr. Dulles emphasized that although the major powers have the right of initiative regarding the peace treaties, this right must be used "affirmatively and constructively, and if not so used, the consequences are of concern to all members of the United Nations".

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

North Pacific Regional Air Navigation Meeting of ICAO

BY CLIFFORD P. BURTON

The North Pacific Regional Air Navigation Meeting held at Seattle, Washington, July 13-29, 1948, under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was the eighth in the original series of ten regional meetings scheduled by ICAO to survey aviation facilities throughout the world. Upon the completion of the series ICAO will have an index of facilities needed by international civil aviation on all the important air routes of the world. The remaining regional meetings projected by ICAO are the African-Indian Ocean Meeting and the Southeast Asia Meeting.

The work of the regional air-navigation meetings, namely, the provision of safe and adequate transportation to international travelers, is basic to all ICAO programs in the technical field. The United States as host government provided the international secretariat for the Seattle meeting with assistance from the technical staff of ICAO at Montreal.

Nine voting countries were present: Australia, Canada, China, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Siam, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In addition, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Poland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics sent observers. International organizations represented were the International Air Transport Association, the International Meteorological Organization, and the United Nations.

The main meeting was preceded by a meeting of a fact-finding group which convened the week prior to the regional meeting in order to examine and document operational data for the convenience and use of the main meeting. The Seattle meeting was the first time such a group was convened. Since it proved its usefulness, the pattern will be made use of at subsequent regional meetings.

The organization employed at the North Pacific Regional Air Navigation Meeting was similar to that used at previous regional meetings. It consisted of the General Committee, Subcommittee 1 of the General Committee, and technical committees in the fields of telecommunications and radio aids, meteorology, search and rescue, air-traffic control, aerodromes, air routes, and ground aids. The General Committee did not handle any substantive material as all technical matters were handled by its No. 1 Subcommittee or in the other technical committees. Clifford P. Burton, Chair-

man of the United States Delegation, was elected Chairman of the meeting, with Colonel Cheng-Fu Wang of China and Colonel Sphrang Devahdstin of Siam elected First Vice Chairman and Second Vice Chairman respectively.

The results of the meeting were quite satisfactory to the United States as the United States position, as approved by the interdepartmental Air Coordinating Committee, was upheld to a high degree. Specific accomplishments in the technical fields are given in the brief summary that follows.

Flight Operations.—Problems in connection with this subject were handled by the No. 1 Subcommittee of the General Committee. The Committee recommended slight alterations in the boundaries of the ICAO regions to exclude the northern portion of Alaska and to extend the southwestern boundary southward to include the Philippines and the eastern coast of China (and Hong Kong). A standard altimeter setting of 29.92 inches of mercury was recommended for the ocean areas excluding the area approximately 100 miles from the shore line. In these latter areas a QNH value for altimeter settings will be utilized for both terrain clearance and altitude separation. In the field of dimensional units it was agreed that the yellow table published by ICAO would be used over the land areas of the United States and Canada with an exception thereto in the ocean areas and the Aleutian chain wherein nautical miles and knots would be substituted for statute miles per hour. The subject of publications and manuals was handled in connection with NOTAM procedures, and the position of the United States was upheld in its entirety.

Aerodromes, Air Routes, and Ground Aids.—The Committee selected regular, alternate, and supplementary aerodromes required for North Pacific air routes. Also, certain aerodromes by class were selected for improvements. It recommended that all aerodrome improvements be completed as rapidly as possible but in no case later than July 1, 1953. The Committee agreed that obstruction marking and ground markers should exist on air routes, that night lighting should be provided at all regular and alternate aerodromes, and that approach lights should be visible where instrument landing systems are installed and where practical at all other regular and alternate aerodromes.

ACTIVITIES AND DEVELOPMENTS

Air Traffic Control.—The Committee recommended the establishment of flight information regions over most of the water areas of the North Pacific. Approach and aerodrome control service was recommended for those aerodromes where the traffic density justified their establishment. During the development of supplementary procedures for this region, the Committee recommended that action be taken to amend the South Pacific supplementary procedures so as to be consistent with the North Pacific supplementary procedures.

Telecommunications and Radio Aids to Air Navigation.—The Committee recommended additional point-to-point and air-ground aeronautical communication circuits to take care of meteorology, air-traffic control, and search-and-rescue requirements. In addition, recommendations were made for additions to the aeronautical radio-navigation aids to meet the needs of the present and proposed routes and aeronautical services operating within the region.

Aeronautical Meteorology.—The Committee reviewed the existing system of meteorological telecommunications and prepared detailed requirements for the exchange of meteorological information between the various meteorological offices as well as for broadcast to aircraft in flight. The Committee recommended the establishment of eight ocean weather ships, the exact location to be determined in general by the implementing state, taking into consideration the requirements of the other technical services such as search and rescue, telecommunications, and air-traffic control.

Search and Rescue.—The Committee reviewed and tabulated the search-and-rescue facilities provided in the region and recommendations for certain additions were made to meet the minimum requirements for the region.

U.S. Delegation to International Tin Study Group

The Department of State announced on October 13 the composition of the United States Delegation to the Third Meeting of the International Tin Study Group, scheduled to open at The Hague on October 25, 1948. The Delegation is as follows:

Chairman

Donald D. Kennedy, Chief, International Resources Division, Department of State

Advisers

Glion Curtis, Jr., American Embassy, The Hague
Carl Ilgenfritz, Vice President, United States Steel Corporation

Charles W. Merrill, Chief, Metal Economics Branch, Bureau of Mines, Department of the Interior

Erwin Vogelsang, Chief, Tin and Antimony Section, Non-ferrous Metals and Minerals Division, Department of Commerce

W. F. McKinnon, Associate Director, Office of Metals Reserve, Reconstruction Finance Corporation
Evan Just, Director, Division of Strategic Materials, Economic Cooperation Administration

The International Tin Study Group will review the report of its working party which met at The Hague in June. It will also review the world statistical position of tin and discuss common problems in connection with production, consumption, and trade in tin.

The International Tin Study Group was established upon a recommendation of the World Tin Conference, held at London in October 1946, to which the principal tin-producing and -consuming countries of the world sent representatives. The last meeting of the Group—the second—was held at Washington, D.C., April 19-24, 1948.

U.S.-Mexican Fisheries Conference

[Released to the press October 15]

Fisheries problems of mutual interest to the United States and Mexico will be the subject for discussion between the two Governments at a conference to be held in Mexico City beginning on October 25.

In line with its program of advancing measures designed to conserve fisheries resources of the high seas the United States is interested in entering into a joint fisheries-conservation agreement with Mexico. However, the present talks are primarily of an exploratory nature, it was emphasized, and delegates are expected to make recommendations for later consideration by the various federal agencies, interested state governments, and representatives of industry.

The United States and Mexico have several bilateral agreements by which the two countries have harmoniously achieved the solution of specialized problems in a spirit of friendly cooperation. The equally outstanding success of the bilateral fisheries conventions between Canada and the United States, by means of which the valuable halibut and sockeye-salmon fisheries have been conserved and developed, makes it appear that cooperation in the sphere of fisheries with our southern neighbor would also be mutually beneficial.

THE CONGRESS

Report of Activities of National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems. Message from the President of the United States transmitting report of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems covering its operations from Oct. 1, 1947, to Mar. 31, 1948. H. Doc. 737, 80th Cong., 2d sess. vi, 56 pp.

Calling on the President for Information Concerning the Potsdam Agreements and Violations Thereof by Soviet Russia. S. Rept. 1440, 80th Cong., 2d sess., to accompany S. Res. 213. 11 pp.

Amending the Trading with the Enemy Act. S. Rept. 1619, 80th Cong., 2d sess., to accompany S. 2764. 3 pp.

Department of State Bulletin

U.S.S.R. Travel Restrictions for Diplomatic Personnel

SUPPLEMENT TO 1941 LIST

The American Embassy at Moscow has received a circular note from the Foreign Office of the U.S.S.R. The note, dated September 30, 1948, refers to the Foreign Office note of May 16, 1941, in terms indicating that the restrictions of that date are still considered in effect and in supplement thereto transmits a new and greatly expanded list on points and localities in or to which travel is prohibited for members of the staffs of foreign missions and consulates. For all practical purposes the list covers the entire territory of the U.S.S.R. Certain omissions, such as points in the Georgian Republic and Yakutsk, U.S.S.R., are notable; the principal additions are the newly acquired territories, such as Sakhalin.

In theory, travel is permitted through certain areas, but one cannot reach those areas without crossing forbidden zones.

The restriction to 50 kilometers radius of Moscow is entirely new, not having been included in the 1941 note. Travel even in this small radius is subject to so many exceptions—i.e., *raions* (districts) where travel is forbidden even though less than 50 kilometers distant—that to all intents and purposes members of the foreign missions are restricted to Moscow city limits.

American correspondents have written stories about the new restrictions, but their stories have been held up by the Soviet censor.

NOTES OF MAY 16, 1941, AND SEPTEMBER 30, 1948

[Translation]

PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Pr/140

NOTE VERBALE

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has the honor to bring to the attention of the [. . . Mission] the information that, beginning with this date, the Government of the U.S.S.R. has established a procedure whereby the travel on the territory of the U.S.S.R. of diplomatic and consular representatives in the U.S.S.R. of foreign states, as well as of employees of foreign embassies, legations and consulates, may take place only on condition that such persons previously inform the appropriate organs of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, the People's Commissariat for Defense and the People's Commissariat for the Navy, with regard to trips planned, indicating the itinerary, the points of stop-over and the length of travel, so that such trips may be registered by the above-mentioned organs.

At the same time, the same Decree of the Soviet Government has declared as prohibited (for travel) the points and localities in the U.S.S.R.

¹ Not here printed.

² List not here printed. A note attached to the list reads as follows:

Members and employees of embassies, missions and consulates are allowed to travel without notifying in advance the appropriate organs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR or the Ministry of Armed Forces of the USSR within a radius of 50 km. from Moscow, with the exception of the following *raions* of Moscow oblast: Dmitrov,

enumerated in the list which is attached hereto.¹
Moscow, May 16, 1941.

[To all Embassies and Missions]
Moscow

[Translation]

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE USSR

No. 1130/Pr.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR presents its compliments to Embassies and Missions and has the honor to communicate that after revision of the list of forbidden points and localities of the USSR transmitted with note no. 140/Pr. of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, dated May 16, 1941, the Government of the USSR has approved a new list of forbidden points and localities of the USSR, which is attached hereto.²

Moscow, September 30, 1948

Seal no. 1 of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

[To all Embassies and Missions]
Moscow

Zvenigorod, Kuntsevo, Krasnogorsk, Krasnopolyansk, Podolsk, Ramensk, Tushino, Khimki and Shchelkovo, where travelling is forbidden.

As an exception, it is permitted to go to the cities of Klin and Zagorsk as well as to Yasnaya Polyana (Tula oblast), providing the travellers proceed along the main automobile highway and have notified in advance the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR or the Ministry of Armed Forces of the USSR about the trip.

October 24, 1948

Relaxing of Visa Restrictions by U.S. and Belgium

[Released to the press October 15]

The Belgian Government, as of October 15, 1948, will waive visa requirements, but not passport requirements, for American citizens proceeding to continental Belgium for transit or for a period of stay not exceeding two months.

The United States, because of existing laws, may not reciprocate in identical terms. However, the United States will grant passport visas without fees and valid for a period of 24 months, instead of the present 12 months' period of validity of such visas, to Belgian nationals who are proceeding to the United States and its possessions for business or pleasure purposes, and who are *bona fide* nonimmigrants within the meaning of the immigration laws, provided the Belgian passport of each bearer remains valid during the period of validity of the visa.

Visas Not Required for Italy

[Released to the press October 5]

The Department of State has been advised that at the present time the Italian Government does not require visas of American tourists for travel to Italy. It has also been advised that as of November 1, 1948, visas will not be required of American citizens for visits to Italy either for business or pleasure.

Since the Registration Act of 1940 requires that all persons other than American citizens entering this country must have United States visas, it is not possible to dispense with visa requirements in the case of Italian citizens coming here. However, as of November 1, the United States will reciprocate to the extent of issuing visas gratis for those Italians coming to this country temporarily for business or pleasure. These visas will be valid for a period of 24 months. In the case of Italians wishing to immigrate to the United States, immigration visas costing \$10 will continue to be required.

Negotiations on Treaty of Friendship Between U.S. and Ireland Resumed

[Released to the press October 15]

The Department of External Affairs of Ireland and the American Legation in Dublin announced on October 15 that negotiations have been resumed at Dublin for the purpose of concluding a comprehensive treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation between Ireland and the United States. Exploratory discussions were initiated last May,

and it is now hoped by the two Governments that it will be possible to reach final agreement within the near future.

This is the most comprehensive treaty of its kind that Ireland has undertaken to negotiate with any country. The provisions of the text now being put in shape by representatives of the two Governments will lay a broad, long-term, contractual basis for the economic relationships between Ireland and the United States and for the fundamental rights and privileges that the nationals of each country enjoy in the other. Currently, these are largely based on treaties concluded between Britain and the United States during the nineteenth century. The new agreement is expected to modernize pertinent features of these old treaties and to contain also many new clauses that reflect present-day needs and developments.

The discussions are being pursued in a spirit of mutual appreciation of the common ideals and outlook of the two nations.

Constitution-Making at Bonn—Continued from page 510

Germany that the kingdom of Piedmont did in unifying Italy in the nineteenth century.

It may be regarded as a striking coincidence that the Bonn convention is meeting on the one hundredth anniversary of the German Revolution of 1848. The Frankfurt Parliament that met that year tried to establish German unity on the basis of liberty and democracy but failed because of the political dilettantism of many of the delegates and because of the lack of vision of the King of Prussia. German unity was, instead, effected on the basis of autocracy by the methods of militarism with disastrous consequences not only to the Reich but to the whole world.

Today the Bonn Parliamentary Council is attempting to make good where Frankfurt failed in establishing German political union on a democratic foundation. The combined German-American Carl Schurz Memorial Celebration, which was held in Frankfurt just two days after the opening of the Bonn convention to do honor to the Forty-Eighters who emigrated to America, was a significant reminder of the close and sympathetic interest with which not only United States Military Government but the American people are following the efforts of the men of Bonn to carry this mission to a successful conclusion.

Department of State Bulletin

Double Taxation: Discussions With Greece

[Released to the press October 14]

Discussions between American and Greek technical experts looking to the conclusion of treaties for the avoidance of double taxation and for administrative cooperation in prevention of tax evasion with respect to income taxes and to taxes on estates of deceased persons will be held at Athens in the latter part of November.

If the discussions are successful and a basis for agreement is found, they will result in the preparation of draft treaties which will be submitted by the negotiators to their respective governments for consideration with a view to signing.

In preparation for the discussions, the American delegation will welcome conferences with interested parties or statements and suggestions from them concerning problems in tax relations with Greece. Communications in this connection should be addressed to Eldon P. King, Special Deputy Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Bureau of Internal Revenue, Washington 25, D.C.

Renegotiations of Certain Tariff Concessions Granted by Brazil, Ceylon, Cuba, and Pakistan

As was indicated in the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN of October 3, 1948, page 445, it was decided at the second session of the contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade held at Geneva from August 16 to September 14 that, because of special problems facing Brazil, Ceylon, Cuba, and Pakistan, certain tariff concessions granted by these countries to the other contracting parties would be the subject of renegotiations.

The purpose of these renegotiations is to reach agreement upon adjustments in the rates of duty on the items which are listed below for each country. The renegotiations are to be carried out initially between the pairs of countries chiefly interested in the particular concessions involved. However, any modifications in the schedules of tariff concessions of these four countries agreed upon during such bilateral negotiations must receive final approval by all of the contracting parties.

Any views of interested persons with regard to these renegotiations should be submitted to the Committee for Reciprocity Information, which is the committee established to receive views on trade-agreement matters. Since it is proposed to begin initial discussions between each of these four countries and the United States on products of primary interest to the United States as soon as possible, it is suggested that any such views will

be of the most value if submitted within the next 30 days. All communications on these matters should be addressed to The Secretary, Committee for Reciprocity Information, Department of Commerce, Washington 25, D.C.

The items which will be the subject of renegotiation are given in Department of State press release 825 of October 11, 1948. The negotiations may also include consideration of new concessions on products not now in the respective schedules of any of the four countries or additional concessions on products already in such schedules.

Austria Extended Time for Renewing Trade-Mark Registrations

The extension of time until and including February 28, 1949, for renewing trade-mark registrations with respect to Austria was granted by the President in proclamation 2816 (13 *Fed. Reg.* 5927) on October 9, 1948.

China Makes Lend-Lease Payment

[Released to the press October 13]

The Department of State announced on October 13 that the Government of China has paid to the Treasury of the United States \$2,824,930.75, representing the second annual installment on principal and interest of the lend-lease pipeline agreement with China.

This agreement, concluded in June 1946, represented lend-lease material on order by the Chinese Government at the end of the war, totaling approximately \$51,000,000. The agreement provides for repayment over a 30-year period at 2½ percent interest.

Appointment of U.S. Member to International Joint Commission

The Department of State announced on October 11 the appointment by President Truman of Eugene W. Weber, Special Assistant to the Assistant Chief of Engineers for Civil Works, Department of the Army, as a member of the United States Section of the International Joint Commission, United States and Canada. This appointment fills the vacancy on the United States Section of the Commission which has existed since the death of R. Walton Moore, Counselor of the Department of State, on February 8, 1941. The Commission will hold its semiannual meeting in Ottawa, Canada, beginning October 12, 1948.

October 24, 1948

Belgium and Luxembourg Join in U.S. Fulbright Plan

[Released to the press October 8]

Belgium, Luxembourg, and the United States signed on October 8 an agreement under the Fulbright act, putting into operation the program of educational exchanges authorized by Public Law 584, 79th Congress. The signing took place in Brussels, with Education Minister Camille Huysmans representing the Belgian Government, the Chargé d'Affaires for Luxembourg representing that country, and Ambassador Alan G. Kirk representing the United States. It was the seventh agreement signed under the act, previous agreements having been made with the Governments of China, Burma, the Philippines, Greece, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.

The agreement provides for a United States Educational Foundation in Belgium to assist in the administration of the educational program financed from certain funds resulting from the sale of United States surplus property to these countries. The present agreement provides for an annual program of the equivalent of \$150,000 in Belgian francs for educational purposes. The program will include the financing of "studies, research, instruction, and other educational activities of or for citizens of the United States of America in schools and institutions of higher learning located in Belgium, the Belgian Congo, and Luxembourg, or of the nationals of Belgium, Belgian Congo, and Luxembourg in the United States schools and institutions of higher learning located outside the continental United States . . . including payment for transportation, tuition, maintenance, and other expenses incident to scholastic activities; or furnishing transportation for nationals of Belgium, the Belgian Congo, and Luxembourg who desire to attend United States schools and institutions of higher learning in the continental United States . . . whose attendance will not deprive citizens of the United States of America of an opportunity to attend such schools and institutions."

The Foundation in Belgium will have an eight-man Board of Directors, the honorary chairman of which will be the United States Ambassador to Belgium. Members of the Board will consist of five United States citizens resident in Belgium including a representation from the United States Embassy in Brussels, two citizens of Belgium, and one citizen of Luxembourg.

In discussing the program in Brussels, Ambassador Kirk said:

"I am very happy about the agreement, because I believe it will continue the tradition of exchange

of students between our universities which has resulted in producing many leaders of thought, education, and government in Belgium and Luxembourg. Also there has been created an outstanding body of Americans who know and love the culture of your country. Even more, with the great interest now being taken by our universities and private foundations in the United States in providing fellowships for foreign students, I look forward to an increasing number of the young men and women of Belgium and Luxembourg finding such opportunities in our country. Although the development of such a program necessarily requires time, its importance is well understood in educational circles in the United States. This is definitely not a one-way street, along which only American traffic will pass.

"During the past year, ten fellowship students went to the United States for advanced study under the auspices of the Belgian-American Educational Foundation. Others were sent by American Rotary, and the American Association of University Women provided for several students. There are even cases where the American students themselves, at some of our universities, have contributed the funds or the expenses of selected foreign students. This, I sincerely believe, is only a beginning. The cordial regard which our countries have for each other will assure that the two-way street will be well traveled."

Information about specific opportunities for American citizens to study, teach, or undertake research in Belgium, Luxembourg, or the Belgian Congo will be made public in the near future. Inquiries about these opportunities and requests for application forms should be addressed to the following three agencies: Institute of International Education, 2 West 45th Street, New York 19, N.Y. (for graduate study); United States Office of Education, Federal Security Agency, Washington 25, D.C. (for teaching in Belgian elementary and secondary schools); and the Conference Board of Associated Research Councils, 2101 Constitution Avenue NW., Washington 25, D.C. (for teaching at the college level and for post-doctoral research).

Second Meeting of Educational Exchange Advisory Commission

Consideration of the basic principles of United States educational exchanges with specific reference to the problems of Eastern Europe and the Iron Curtain countries was undertaken at the second meeting of the United States Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange in a two-day session, October 18 and 19.¹

In addition, the Commission discussed problems presented to it by George V. Allen, Assistant Secretary of State for public affairs, concerning the disposal of art objects now in this country from occupied countries.

¹ For an account of the Commission's first meeting, see Department of State publication 3313.

Sales and Transfers of Nondemilitarized Combat Matériel

[Released to the press October 12]

List of consummated sales of surplus combat matériel, effected by the Department of State in its capacity as foreign-surplus disposal agent, during

the months of February, April, May, July, and August, 1948, and December 1947, as reported to the Munitions Division of the Department through October 11, 1948, and not previously announced is as follows:

Country	Description of matériel	Procurement cost	Sales price	Date of transfer
Brazil	Spare parts for aircraft engines	\$22, 648. 70	\$1, 132. 44	8/7/48
	Miscellaneous spare parts for machine guns, armored cars, and cleaning and preserving materials.	22, 236. 01	9, 609. 11	8/27/48
China	Miscellaneous parts and equipment for aircraft	5, 093, 273. 15	891, 322. 80	7/29/48
	42 P-47-D Aircraft (militarized)	6, 781, 451. 00	544, 500. 00	8/7/48
	255 Aircraft engines (for C-46s and C-47s)	3, 798, 547. 50	393, 500. 00	8/16/48
Denmark	Torpedo boat T-19 (non-demilitarized)	(¹)	5, 000. 00	Feb. 48
Finland	5 Minesweepers to Finnish Purchasing Mission (demilitarized).	2, 911, 250. 00	175, 000. 00	5/5/48
Italy	1 Minesweeper to Italian national (demilitarized)	582, 250. 00	25, 050. 00	4/10/48
Mexico	Helmets and liners	74, 500. 00	7, 450. 00	8/19/48
Netherlands	66 Tank engines—to be demilitarized for scrap	192, 030. 00	50, 000. 00	8/3/48
	Miscellaneous ordnance equipment	1, 877. 00	303. 10	8/13/48
	Ammunition	1, 560. 00	80. 00	8/13/48
Norway	Ex-German freighter, <i>Drau</i>	(¹)	422, 500. 00	7/26/48
United Kingdom	1 LST for scrap (demilitarized)	2, 171, 280. 00	1, 800. 00	12/17/47
Venezuela	Miscellaneous gas masks and repair kit, bayonets, binoculars, carbines, clinometers, machine guns, truck mounts, helmets and liners.	63, 507. 91	7, 206. 01	8/16/48

¹ Captured enemy matériel.

"Korea, 1945 to 1948" Released

[Released to the press October 15]

The Department of State announced on October 15 the issuance of its newest publication, *Korea, 1945 to 1948*. This pamphlet reviews the political developments within Korea from the time of entry of the U.S. Army forces into that country to the present, with special emphasis on the period after March 1947 not covered by the Department's previous publication, *Korea's Independence*. It contains also a survey of Korean economic conditions and a supplementary selection of documents.

The pamphlet, Department of State publication 3305, will be sold by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., for 25 cents a copy with a 25 percent discount to purchasers of 100 copies or more.

PUBLICATIONS

Department of State

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

October 24, 1948

Education: Cooperative Program in Peru. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1740. Pub. 3166. 25 pp. 10¢.

Arrangement Between the United States and Peru—effected by exchange of notes signed at Lima April 1 and 15, 1944; entered into force April 15, 1944; And Memorandum of Agreement—Signed at Lima April 4, 1944; effective April 4, 1944; Supplementary Agreement No. 1—Signed at Lima January 30, 1945; entered into force January 30, 1945; Supplement to Memorandum of Agreement—Signed April 30, 1945; entered into force April 30, 1945.

Economic Cooperation with Iceland Under Public Law 472—80th Congress. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1787. Pub. 3252. 69 pp. 20¢.

Agreement Between the United States and Iceland—Signed at Reykjavik July 3, 1948; entered into force July 3, 1948.

Economic Cooperation with Italy Under Public Law 472—80th Congress. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1789. Pub. 3253. 55 pp. 15¢.

Agreement Between the United States and Italy—Signed at Rome June 28, 1948; entered into force June 28, 1948.

National Commission News, October 1948. Pub. 3292. 10 pp. 10¢ a copy; \$1 a year domestic, \$1.35 a year foreign.

Prepared monthly for the United States National Commission for UNESCO.

Departmental Regulations

270.1 Departmental Responsibilities in the Programs for Acquisition and Use of Foreign Currency and Credit Assets: (Effective 8-9-48) Experience with and responsibility for the use of foreign currency and credit assets within the Department have crystallized to the point where the existing arrangements can now be formalized in this regulation.

I GENERAL.

A Acquisition and Use. As a result of the sale of surplus property abroad and the making of lend-lease settlements, the United States has acquired foreign currencies and credits amounting to several millions of dollars and is in a position to acquire substantially more. These foreign currencies and credits can be and are being employed to provide funds for the acquisition or improvement of real property for the Foreign Service; to promote educational activities contemplated by the Fulbright Act; and, in some instances, to meet current Governmental expenses abroad.

B Specific Use. Except for expenses for an administrative staff, the Fulbright Program is being financed solely through the use of foreign currency and credit assets arising from the sale of surplus properties abroad and does not depend upon current appropriations. For the foreign buildings program and for Departmental administrative expenses abroad, foreign currency and credit assets, obtained either from surplus property sales or other sources, are purchased from the Treasury Department or from such other Government agency or corporation as may have such currencies or credits, with funds obtained from current appropriations specified for these purposes.

II OFFICE AND DIVISION RESPONSIBILITIES. Subject to the policy determinations and general supervision of the appropriate Assistant Secretaries and Office Directors, responsibilities under these programs are delegated as follows:

A Division of Organization and Budget (OB). OB will:

- 1 Coordinate Departmental planning for the use of foreign currencies and credits for the various programs and allocate available currencies and credits in accordance with approved plans. The coordinating responsibility includes clearance of proposals of the Division of Foreign Buildings Operations (FBO) and the Division of Exchange of Persons (IEP) for foreign currencies and credits to be drawn down from foreign governments and for reservation of foreign currencies on deposit in the Treasury; clearance of FBO and IEP requests for requisitions to foreign governments for currency draw-downs; and clearance of FBO requests for purchases of unreserved currencies from United States Government agencies.
- 2 Develop plans and recommendations for use of foreign currency and credit assets to pay Departmental administrative expenses abroad.
- 3 Maintain necessary liaison with and obtain required clearances from the Bureau of the Budget. Ascertain through the Bureau of the Budget that proposed plans for use of foreign currency and credit assets are in accord with the President's over-all program.
- 4 Review and approve necessary reports to the Congress or Bureau of the Budget on foreign-currency and credit-usage programs. IEP will be responsible for educational-program reports; FBO for buildings-program reports; OB for reports on general administrative expenses.

5 Prepare other consolidated reports as may be required; FBO, IEP, and other offices concerned supplying OB with any additional information required for this purpose.

6 Maintain a central record, by country and program, showing source, allocation, and utilization of foreign currencies and credits. As required, OB will issue reports, based upon this record, for the use of all interested offices, such as FBO, IEP, Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner (OFLC), and Office of Financial and Development Policy (OFD).

7 On request, provide technical advice on budget, organization, and management matters relating to educational-foundation operations.

B Division of Finance (DF). DF will:

- 1 Act as the central drafting and transmitting point for all requests to draw down foreign currencies as payments under surplus property, executive, and lend-lease agreements.
- 2 Conduct necessary liaison with the Treasury Department and other Government agencies and corporations from which foreign currencies may be purchased, regarding specific foreign-currency purchase transactions including liaison with respect to reimbursement from FBO and general administrative appropriations for foreign currencies purchased from whatever source.
- 3 Designate depositories for foundation funds.
- 4 Upon request provide technical advice and assistance in fiscal and accounting matters relating to the acquisition and use of foreign currency and credit assets.
- 5 Prepare certification for Fulbright purposes under Treasury Regulation 799.

C Division of Exchange of Persons (IEP). IEP will:

- 1 Develop educational programs under the Fulbright Amendment to the Surplus Property Act.
- 2 Draft and negotiate through appropriate Departmental channels, executive agreements with other governments establishing educational programs.
- 3 Initiate requests, through OB, for concurrence of the Bureau of the Budget for the reservation of foreign currencies for the Fulbright Program.
- 4 Initiate requests, through OB, for reservation of foreign currencies by the Treasury Department.
- 5 Initiate requests, through OB for draw-downs or transfers of foreign currencies.
- 6 Initiate requisitions, through DF, for foreign currencies to be transferred to particular foundations from Treasury holdings.
- 7 Supervise, review, and issue regulations governing educational-foundation operations (including organization, budget, and fiscal operations).
- 8 Establish a basis for each foundation to maintain adequate current records of its operations.
- 9 Prepare reports on educational-program activities for transmission to the Congress, as required by public law (60 Stat. 755), and provide information on the Fulbright Program for inclusion in other Departmental reports.

D Division of Foreign Buildings Operations (FBO). FBO will:

- 1 Develop foreign-buildings programs utilizing available foreign currencies and credits under public law (60 Stat. 663).

2 Negotiate, through appropriate Departmental channels, agreements with foreign governments for the acquisition of property.

3 Initiate requests, through OB for reservations of foreign currencies by the Treasury Department.

4 Initiate requests, through OB and DF, for draw-downs or purchases of unreserved foreign currencies.

5 Initiate requests, through DF, for purchases of reserved foreign currencies.

6 Initiate, through OFLC, instructions authorizing acceptance of specific properties as payments in kind under the provisions of surplus-property and lend-lease agreements authorizing acceptance of property. FBO will furnish OFLC with the customary Certificate of Valuation, stated in terms of United States dollars, which will be used by OFLC as a basis for acknowledging the payment by the foreign government and for transfer of funds from the Foreign Service Buildings Fund to Miscellaneous Receipts (Proceeds of Surplus Property or proceeds from Lend-Lease Settlements).

7 Prepare reports on utilization of foreign currency and credit assets in the buildings program as required.

E Division of Financial Affairs (FN).

1 While the surplus property and lend-lease programs involve several divisions of OFD, FN is primarily responsible for the foreign-currency aspects of those programs. FN will:

a Make the basic economic- and financial-policy judgments regarding the acceptance of foreign currencies in lieu of dollar obligations. In those cases in which economic conditions do not warrant the acceptance by the United States of foreign currencies in lieu of dollars, the office responsible for the program for which the foreign currency is to be used, may forward a recommendation to the Under Secretary to accept the foreign currencies on other grounds.

b Determine whether foreign-currency provisions will be incorporated in new lend-lease agreements.

c Determine, in applicable cases, the policy with respect to the drawings of foreign currencies in lieu of United States dollars under the foreign-currency option authority.

d Amend, for countries whose economic and financial prospects warrant it, lend-lease agreements in order to authorize acceptance of local currency or payment in kind in lieu of payment in dollar obligations.

e Conduct necessary liaison with the Treasury Department and other interested United States Government agencies with respect to foreign financial-policy aspects of the programs including exchange rates, convertibility of foreign currencies and applicability of foreign-exchange control regulations.

f Review and clear proposed Fulbright executive agreements, certifications for Fulbright purposes under Treasury Regulation 799, proposed reservations for foreign currencies and credits for Departmental programs, and draw-downs of foreign currency and credit assets under surplus-property and lend-lease agreements for conformance to appropriate aspects of United States foreign financial policy including those relating to exchange rates, convertibility of foreign currencies, and applicability of foreign-exchange control regulations.

g Advise OFLC and the War Assets Administration (WAA) (or its successors) regarding the acceptance of foreign currency in connection with cash and credit sales of surplus property which cannot be made for dollars. Also advise OFLC and WAA (or its successors) in the formulation of agreement clauses granting the United States Government the option of drawing foreign currency in lieu of dollars.

2 The foreign buildings program, with respect to United States foreign financial-policy aspects, will be cleared between FBO and FN at the beginning of each fiscal year. Should it become necessary to make substantial variations in the original proposal, FBO will clear the changes in advance with FN.

F Legal Adviser (L). L will review Fulbright executive agreements for conformance with enabling legislation; draft and review proposed legislation affecting the use of foreign currencies and credits; and furnish necessary legal opinions regarding the use of foreign currencies and credits under existing legislation.

G Office of the Foreign Service (OFS). OFS will provide advice and assistant to the Office of Educational Exchange (OEX) on the administrative relationships between the Foreign Service establishments and educational foundations.

H Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner (OFLC). OFLC will:

1 Review and clear instructions pertaining to the acquisition of foreign currencies and properties as payments under the provisions of surplus-property agreements, as well as under joint surplus-property and lend-lease agreements, except that routine acquisitions of foreign currency made in accordance with agreed procedures and within established allocations need not be individually cleared.

2 Maintain accounts necessary to establish records of payments received and balances due from foreign governments under surplus-property agreements.

3 Determine the terms of payment, including those relating to the acquisition of foreign currency and property, which will be incorporated in new surplus-property agreements and in appropriate amendments to existing agreements. With regard to the acquisition of foreign currency, OFLC will consult with FN.

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